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into the New Economic Geography. We generalize the constructed capital ap-
proach, which relies on infinite individual planning horizons, by introducing
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1 Introduction
The New Economic Geography literature pioneered by Krugman (1991),
Venables (1996) and Krugman and Venables (1995) provided new insights
into how transport costs can determine the spatial distribution of economic
activity between two regions. These models are mainly characterized by
catastrophic agglomeration. Due to circular causality effects encouraging
the concentration of industrial activity, there are certain levels of trans-
port costs for which the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable and the
core periphery outcome is the only stable equilibrium. Reciprocal liber-
alization between initially symmetric regions that strengthens the impor-
tance of such circular causality forces thus leads to the agglomeration of
productive factors in one region. Puga (1999) set up a model that nested
as special cases both the Krugman (1991) framework with labor mobility
between regions as well as the vertically linked-industries model of Ven-
ables (1996) and Krugman and Venables (1995) without interregional labor
mobility. However, the richness of agglomeration features in these models
reduced their analytical tractability. Therefore Baldwin (1999) introduced
the constructed capital framework with interregional labor and capital im-
mobility but forward-looking agents. His model also features catastrophic
agglomeration. The only force determining agglomeration is, however, the
difference in the effective capital rental rates between the two regions. A
higher rental rate in the home region increases home capital accumulation,
whereas capital is decumulated in the foreign region. Circular causality
sets in as a higher capital stock also implies higher capital income which
in turn raises home expenditures and leads to a further increase in home
rental rates. Since neoclassical growth models in the spirit of Solow (1956)
and Ramsey (1928) show that capital accumulation is associated with faster
growth in the medium run, Baldwin (1999) describes the economy accumu-
lating capital as a growth pole, whereas the other region appears as a growth
sink. This illustrates how economic integration in Europe could lead to the
development of “rust” and “boom belts”.
In contrast to the Ramsey (1928) framework of one single, infinitely lived,
representative agent, on which the constructed capital model heavily relies,
agents do not live forever in reality. We therefore generalize Baldwin (1999)’s
approach by introducing the possibility of death and thus accounting for
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finite planning horizons. In doing so, we adopt Blanchard (1985)’s structure
of overlapping generations, where heterogeneity among individuals is due
to their date of birth. While still following the lines of intertemporally
optimizing agents, this results in a more realistic model incorporating life-
cycle decisions and nesting the constructed capital model as a special case.
Most notably, it allows us to study the effects of aging on agglomeration
processes between two regions.
Our results indicate that Baldwin (1999)’s agglomeration induced growth
finding only applies in the very special case of infinitely lived individuals.
In particular, we show that under a more realistic mortality assumption the
possibility of the symmetric equilibrium to be unstable is considerably re-
duced such that agglomeration processes may not set in even if economic
integration is promoted up to a high degree. Lifetime uncertainty there-
fore acts as a dispersion force that countervails the circular causality effects
present in our framework.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of the
model and the optimization problems of individuals and firms. Section 3
verifies the existence of a symmetric long-run equilibrium and characterizes
its properties. Section 4 analyzes the stability of this long-run equilibrium
with positive mortality and compares them to the results of Baldwin (1999)
without mortality. By calibrating the model for reasonable values of the pa-
rameters, we complement our analytical findings by numerical illustrations.
Finally, section 5 summarizes and draws conclusions for economic policy.
2 The model
This section describes how we integrate Blanchard (1985)’s notion of mortal-
ity into the constructed capital framework of Baldwin (1999). Consumption
and savings behavior as well as production technologies are introduced and
various intermediate findings resulting from profit maximization are pre-
sented. In order to be able to analyze the long-run equilibrium, we also
derive aggregate law of motions for capital and expenditures.
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2.1 Basic structure and underlying assumptions
The model consists of two regions or countries, referred to as H for home
and F for foreign1, with symmetric production technologies and preferences
of individuals as well as identical labor endowments and demographic struc-
tures. Each region has three economic sectors (agriculture, manufacturing
and investment) with two immobile factors (labor L and capital K) at their
disposal. The homogeneous agricultural good, n, is produced in a perfectly
competitive market with labor as the only input and can be traded between
the two regions without any costs. Manufacturing firms are modeled as in
the monopolistic competition framework of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and
therefore produce varieties, denoted as m, with one unit of capital as fixed
input and labor as the variable production factor. A continuum of vari-
eties i ∈ (0, VH ] of all manufacturing goods is produced at home, whereas
a continuum of varieties j ∈ (0, VF ] is manufactured in the foreign region.
In contrast to the agricultural good, trade of manufactures involves iceberg
transport costs such that ϕ ≥ 1 units of the differentiated goods have to
be shipped in order to sell one unit abroad (see for example Baldwin et al.
(2003)). In the Walrasian investment sector capital is produced using labor
as the only input with a time independent, exogenous unit input coefficient
F where wages are paid out of the individuals’ savings. The failure rate of a
machine is assumed to be independent of the machine’s age. Denoting this
failure rate as 0 < δ ≤ 1, and using the law of large numbers, implies that
the overall depreciation rate of capital is given by δ as well.
As far as the demographic structure of our model economy is concerned,
we closely follow Blanchard (1985)’s simplified setting. We assume that at
each point in time, τ ∈ [0,∞), a large cohort consisting of finitely many indi-
viduals is born. The size of this cohort is N(τ, τ) = µN(τ), where 0 < µ ≤ 1
is the constant birth rate and N(τ) ≡ ∫ τ−∞N(t0, τ)dt0 is total population
at time τ with N(t0, τ) denoting the amount of individuals born at t0 for
a given point in time τ .2 Consequently, cohorts can be distinguished by
the birth date t0 of their members. Since there is no heterogeneity between
members of the same cohort, each cohort can be described by one repre-
sentative individual, who inelastically supplies his efficiency units of labor
1If further distinction is needed, foreign variables are moreover indicated by an asterisk.
2In what follows the first time index of a variable will refer to the birth date, whereas
the second will indicate a certain point in time.
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at the labor market with perfect mobility across sectors but immobility be-
tween regions. The age of the individual is given by a = τ − t0 and his time
of death is stochastic with an exponential probability density function. In
particular, the probability of death is given by the constant, i.e. age inde-
pendent, parameter µ resulting in a surviving probability to age τ − t0 of
e−µ(τ−t0). Since the population size is large, the frequency of dying is equal
to the instantaneous mortality rate. Therefore the number of deaths at each
instant in time is also µN(τ). As this equals, by assumption, the number of
births, population size is constant and can be normalized to unity (N(τ)=1).
Finally, as in Yaari (1965), a perfect life-insurance company offers actuarial
notes, which can be bought or sold by each individual and are canceled upon
the individual’s death.
2.2 The individual’s utility optimization problem
The following discussion refers to the home economy but due to symmetry
between the two regions, equivalent equations also hold abroad. Individ-
uals have Cobb-Douglas preferences over the agricultural good and a CES
composite of manufacturing goods. Based on the assumptions of section
2.1 the representative individual of cohort t0 maximizes his expected life-
time utility U(t0, t0)3 at time t0. He therefore chooses at each instant τ > t0
consumption of the agricultural good, cn(t0, τ), consumption of varieties pro-
duced at home, cHm(i, t0, τ), and consumption of varieties produced abroad,
cFm(j, t0, τ), according to the maximization problem
max
cn,cHm,c
F
m
∫ ∞
t0
e−(ρ+µ)(τ−t0) ln
[
(cn(t0, τ))1−ξ(caggm (t0, τ))
ξ
]
dτ, (1)
where 0 < ρ ≤ 1 is the pure rate of time preference, 0 < ξ < 1 is the
manufacturing share of consumption and
caggm (t0, τ) ≡
[∫ VH(τ)
0
(
cHm(i, t0, τ)
)σ−1
σ di+
∫ VF (τ)
0
(
cFm(j, t0, τ)
)σ−1
σ dj
] σ
σ−1
represents consumption of the CES composite of manufactured goods with
σ > 1 denoting the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
3It is easy to show that the objective in equation (1) can be derived via calculating
expected lifetime utility, where the time of death is a random variable with an exponential
probability density function parameterized by a constant instantaneous mortality rate µ.
5
Individual savings, defined as income minus consumption expenditures,
are converted into capital in the investment sector with a labor input coeffi-
cient of F . Taking this into account, the wealth constraint of a representative
individual can be written as
k˙(t0, τ) =
w(τ)l(t0, τ) + pi(τ)k(t0, τ)− e(t0, τ)
w(τ)F
+ µk(t0, τ)− δk(t0, τ), (2)
where w(τ) denotes the wage per efficiency unit of labor, l(t0, τ) refers to the
efficiency units of labor the representative individual of cohort t0 supplies,
pi(τ) is the capital rental rate, k(t0, τ) the capital stock of an individual and
e(t0, τ) are an individual’s total expenditures for consumption given by
e(t0, τ) ≡ pn(τ)cn(t0, τ) +
∫ VH(τ)
0
pHm(i, τ)c
H
m(i, t0, τ)di+∫ VF (τ)
0
pFm,ϕ(j, τ)c
F
m(j, t0, τ)dj.
Here pn(τ) is the price of the agricultural good, pHm(i, τ) the price of a manu-
factured variety produced at home and pFm,ϕ(j, τ) the price of a manufactured
variety produced abroad with the subscript ϕ indicating the dependence on
transport costs.
The particular law of motion for capital given above in equation (2) is
based on Yaari (1965)’s full insurance result implying that all individuals
only hold their wealth in the form of actuarial notes.4 Therefore the market
rate of return on capital, pi(τ)w(τ)F − δ, has to be augmented by µ to obtain the
fair rate on actuarial notes (cf. Yaari (1965)).
In appendix A we solve the individual’s utility optimization problem by
applying a three stage procedure. In the first stage the dynamic savings-
expenditure decision is analyzed. Stage two deals with the static optimal
consumption allocation between the CES composite and the agricultural
good and in stage three individuals decide upon the amount of consumption
they allocate to each of the manufactured varieties. Altogether this leads to
the following demand functions for the agricultural good and for each of the
4Two interpretations of the capital accumulation process are therefore possible. Either
each individual itself converts its savings into capital and then leaves it to the insurance
company or savings are immediately transferred to the insurance company which converts
them into machines by employing workers.
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manufactured varieties
cn(t0, τ) =
(1− ξ)e(t0, τ)
pn(τ)
, (3)
cHm(i, t0, τ) =
ξe(t0, τ)(pHm(i, τ))
−σ[∫ VH(τ)
0 (p
H
m(i, τ))1−σdi+
∫ VF (τ)
0 (p
F
m,ϕ(j, τ))1−σdj
] , (4)
cFm(j, t0, τ) =
ξe(t0, τ)(pFm,ϕ(j, τ))
−σ[∫ VH(τ)
0 (p
H
m(i, τ))1−σdi+
∫ VF (τ)
0 (p
F
m,ϕ(j, τ))1−σdj
] (5)
as well as to the consumption Euler equation for the representative individ-
ual of cohort t0
e˙(t0, τ)
e(t0, τ)
=
pi(τ)
Fw(τ)
− δ − ρ. (6)
As first shown by Yaari (1965) the representative individual’s Euler equation
with fully insured lifetime uncertainty is identical to the Euler equation when
no lifetime uncertainty exists, i.e. the individual Euler equation does not
include the mortality rate.
2.3 Aggregate expenditures and capital
Due to the overlapping generations structure resulting from the introduc-
tion of mortality into the constructed capital framework, our model setup
does not feature one single representative individual. In order to be able
to analyze the long-run equilibrium of the economy as well as its stability
properties it is therefore necessary to derive the aggregate law of motions
of capital and consumption expenditures. The capital stock of the economy
at a certain point in time t is the aggregate of individual capital stocks in-
tegrated over all birth dates. Analogous definitions apply to consumption
expenditures and the available efficiency units of labor. These aggregation
rules are formally given by
K(t) ≡
∫ t
−∞
k(t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0, (7)
E(t) ≡
∫ t
−∞
e(t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0, (8)
L(t) ≡
∫ t
−∞
l(t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0, (9)
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where K(t) is the aggregate capital stock, L(t) refers to the total amount of
available efficiency units of labor and E(t) denotes aggregate consumption
expenditures. Equivalent equations hold for the foreign region.
Using the demographic assumptions described in section 2.1 we can ex-
actly trace the size N(t0, t) of any particular cohort over time. A cohort
born at time t0 is of size µe−µ(t−t0) at time t ≥ t0 as the probability of
surviving to time t equals e−µ(t−t0) and the initial size of the cohort is µ.
Substituting for N(t0, t) in equation (8) therefore yields
E(t) ≡ µ
∫ t
−∞
e(t0, t)e−µ(t−t0)dt0. (10)
The aggregate Euler equation directly follows from equation (10) by dif-
ferentiating it with respect to t and then substituting for e˙(t0, t) from the
individual Euler equation (6) and for e(t, t) and E(t) from the corresponding
expressions derived in appendix B where we describe the various aggregation
steps in detail.5 It is given by
E˙(t)
E(t)
= −µ(ρ+ µ)Fw(t)K(t)
E(t)
+
pi(t)
w(t)F
− ρ− δ (11)
= −µE(t)− e(t, t)
E(t)
+
e˙(t0, t)
e(t0, t)
. (12)
This aggregate Euler equation, modified for the existence of overlapping gen-
erations of finitely lived agents, is identical to the individual Euler equation
given in expression (6) except for an additional correction term resulting
from the distributional effects caused by the turnover of generations (cf.
Heijdra and van der Ploeg (2002), chapter 16). Optimal consumption ex-
penditure growth is the same for all generations but older generations have
a higher consumption expenditure level than younger generations because
they are wealthier. Since newborns with no capital holdings continually
replace dying old generations, aggregate consumption expenditure growth
is smaller than individual consumption expenditure growth. The correction
term on the right hand side of equation (11) therefore describes the difference
between average consumption expenditures6 and consumption expenditures
5Those aggregation steps closely follow the ones described by Heijdra and van der Ploeg
(2002) in chapter 16.
6Since we normalized total population size to 1, total consumption expenditures E(t)
are equal to average consumption expenditures.
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by newborns as shown in equation (12). As E(t)− e(t, t) is unambiguously
positive, a higher mortality rate decreases aggregate consumption expendi-
ture growth. This is intuitively clear as a higher µ implies a higher gener-
ational turnover and therefore a higher (negative) impact of the correction
term, and it is also consistent with the life-cycle savings literature (see for
example Gertler (1999)).
Similarly, the aggregate law of motion for the capital stock can be ob-
tained. Rewriting equation (7) in analogy to equation (10) and then differ-
entiating it with respect to t yields
K˙(t) =
[
pi(t)
w(t)F
− δ
]
K(t) +
w(t)L(t)
w(t)F
− E(t)
w(t)F
, (13)
where we applied the same steps as in the derivation for the aggregate Euler
equation shown in appendix B.7 Compared to the law of motion for indi-
vidual capital there appears no term featuring the mortality rate µ. This
captures the fact that µK(t) does not represent aggregate capital accumu-
lation but is a transfer - via the life insurance company - from individuals
who died to those who survived within a given cohort. As a consequence,
aggregate capital accumulates at a rate pi(t)w(t)F −δ, whereas individual capital
attracts the actuarial interest rate pi(t)w(t)F + µ − δ for surviving individuals
(cf. Heijdra and van der Ploeg (2002), chapter 16).
Summarizing, the mortality rate µ enters the law of motion for the in-
dividual capital stock but disappears in the corresponding aggregate law of
motion. This is in sharp contrast to the Euler equation, where we have seen
that µ does not show up at the individual level but is part of the aggregate
consumption expenditure growth rate.
2.4 Production technology and profit maximization
Profit maximization in the manufacturing and agricultural sector closely
follows Baldwin (1999) and yields various intermediate results that simplify
the subsequent analysis of the long-run equilibrium. In particular, the way
the manufacturing sector is modeled allows us to derive the rental rate of
capital as a function of home and foreign capital stocks and expenditures.
7In particular, we substituted for k˙(t0, t) from equation (2).
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2.4.1 Agricultural sector
The homogeneous agricultural good, which can be interpreted as food, is
produced according to the following constant returns to scale production
function
Yn(t) =
1
α
Ln(t), (14)
where Yn(t) denotes output of the agricultural sector, Ln(t) represents ag-
gregate labor devoted to agricultural production, and α is the unit input
coefficient in the production of agricultural goods. Free trade of the agri-
cultural good between home and foreign equalizes its price as long as each
of the two regions produces some Yn(t). This can be shown to hold if ξ, the
manufacturing share of consumption, is not too large (cf. Baldwin (1999))
which will be assumed from now on. Profit maximization under perfect com-
petition implies that firms charge the following price which equals marginal
costs
pn(t) = αwn(t). (15)
Since labor is perfectly mobile across sectors the wage rate in the economy
w(t) satisfies
wn(t) = wm(t) = winv(t) = w(t), (16)
where wn(t), wm(t) and winv(t) denote wages in the agricultural, manufac-
turing and investment sector. Therefore equation (15) pins down equilibrium
wages which are equalized across regions due to free trade. Moreover, by
choice of units for agricultural output, α can be set to one implying that the
wage rate is equal to the price of the agricultural good. Finally, choosing
the agricultural good as numeraire leads to
w(t) = w∗(t) = 1. (17)
2.4.2 Manufacturing sector
Each firm in the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monopolistically competitive man-
ufacturing sector produces a different output variety using labor as variable
and one variety-specific machine as fixed input. This machine originates
from the investment sector and is equivalent to one unit of capital. Due to
the fixed costs, firms face an increasing returns to scale production technol-
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ogy with an associated cost function
pi(t) + w(t)βYm(i, t), (18)
where β is the unit input coefficient for efficiency units of labor, Ym(i, t) is
total output of one manufacturing good producer and the capital rental rate
pi(t) represents the fixed cost. Since we have variety specificity of capital
and free entry into the manufacturing sector driving pure profits down to
zero, this capital rental rate is equivalent to the Ricardian surplus, i.e. the
operating profit of each manufacturing firm. In particular, the insurance
companies, which hold all the capital (cf. section 2.2), rent their capital
holdings to the manufacturing firms and can fully extract all profits.
Defining8 Pm(t) ≡
∫ VH(t)
0 (p
H
m(i, t))
1−σdi +
∫ VF (t)
0 (p
F
m,ϕ(j, t))
1−σdj and
P ∗m(t) ≡
∫ VF (t)
0 (p
H
m(j, t))
1−σdj+
∫ VH(t)
0 (p
F
m,ϕ(i, t))
1−σdi and recognizing that
each individual firm has mass zero and hence does not influence the price
indexes Pm and P ∗m, leads to the following maximization problem for each
firm at time t9
max
pHm,p
F
m,ϕ
(pHm(i, t)− w(t)β)
(∫ t
−∞
cHm(i, t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0
)
+(pFm,ϕ(i, t)− w(t)ϕβ)
(∫ t
−∞
cH∗m (i, t0, t)N
∗(t0, t)dt0
)
s.t. cHm(i, t0, t) =
ξe(t0, t)(pHm(i, t))
−σ
Pm(t)
cH∗m (i, t0, t) =
ξe∗(t0, t)(pFm,ϕ(i, t))−σ
P ∗m(t)
. (19)
Carrying out the associated calculations shown in appendix C gives expres-
sions for optimal prices
pHm(i, t) =
σ
σ − 1w(t)β, (20)
pFm,ϕ(i, t) =
σ
σ − 1w(t)βϕ. (21)
8Note that p∗Hm (i, t) = p
F
m,ϕ(i, t) and p
∗F
m (j, t) = p
H
m(j, t) due to symmetry between the
two regions, where p∗Hm (i, t) is the price of a good manufactured in the home economy but
sold in the foreign region.
9We ignore fixed costs in the derivations here as they do not influence the first order
conditions. Therefore we just maximize operating profits defined as revenues from selling
the variety to the home and foreign region minus variable production costs (taking into
account the effect of transport costs).
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Therefore the profit maximization problem yields the familiar rule that
prices are equal to a constant markup over marginal costs which decreases
in σ. This implies that a higher elasticity of substitution reduces the market
power of manufacturing firms. Moreover, mill pricing is optimal, i.e. the
only difference between prices in the two regions is due to transport costs
(cf. Baldwin et al. (2003)).
Using the first order conditions of the maximization problem formulated
in equation (19) (see appendix C as well as Baldwin (1999) for details of the
following derivations) and defining
sHH(t) ≡
pHm(t)
∫ t
−∞ c
H
m(t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0∫ t
−∞ ξe(t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0
, (22)
sFH(t) ≡
pFm,ϕ(t)
∫ t
−∞ c
H∗
m (t0, t)N
∗(t0, t)dt0∫ t
−∞ ξe
∗(t0, t)N∗(t0, t)dt0
(23)
as the share of a domestic firm in the home and in the foreign market with
equivalent definitions holding for sFF (t) and s
H
F (t) gives rental rates in the
home and foreign region as
pi(t) =
ξ
σ
[∫ t
−∞
sHH(t)e(t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0 +
ξ
σ
∫ t
−∞
sFH(t)e
∗(t0, t)N∗(t0, t)dt0
]
,
(24)
pi∗(t) =
ξ
σ
[∫ t
−∞
sFF (t)e
∗(t0, t)N∗(t0, t)dt0 +
ξ
σ
∫ t
−∞
sHF (t)e(t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0
]
.
(25)
Again using mill pricing and redefining global quantities and regional share
variables leads to the final expressions for regional rental rates10
pi =
(
θE
θK + φ(1− θK) +
(1− θE)φ
φθK + 1− θK
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bias
(
ξEW
σKW
)
, (26)
pi∗ =
(
1− θE
1− θK + φθK +
θEφ
φ(1− θK) + θK
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bias∗
(
ξEW
σKW
)
, (27)
where φ ≡ ϕ1−σ is a measure of openness between the two regions with
10We ignore time arguments here.
12
φ = 0 indicating prohibitive trade barriers and φ = 1 free trade. World
expenditures are defined as EW ≡ E + E∗ and the world capital stock as
KW ≡ K + K∗ with θK and θE being the respective home shares of these
quantities, i.e. θK ≡ KK+K∗ and θE ≡ EE+E∗ . As expected, these rental rates
are identical to those derived in Baldwin (1999)’s constructed capital model,
since the introduction of mortality does not change the production side of
the economy. Analogously to Baldwin (1999), the terms labeled Bias and
Bias∗ can be interpreted as the bias in national sales, i.e. Bias measures
the extent to which a home variety’s sales exceed the world average sales
per variety. Additionally, these terms describe the impact of production
and expenditure shifting on profits. In the symmetric case with θK = 1/2
and θE = 1/2, shifting expenditure to home (dθE > 0) raises pi and lowers
pi∗ since it increases the market size at home. Production shifting11 to
home (dθK > 0), on the other hand, has the opposite impact as it increases
competition in the home market. It can be shown that lowering trade costs
weakens the magnitude of both effects but erodes the local competition
effect more rapidly. Consequently, agglomerative tendencies gain weight
as integration between the two regions is increased. The crucial question
to be investigated in the following sections is whether these agglomerative
tendencies are strong enough to create a core periphery outcome with all
capital, and thus all manufacturing firms, located in one region which is the
case in the constructed capital model of Baldwin (1999).
3 Long-run equilibrium
The dynamics of this neoclassical growth model with overlapping generations
are fully described by the following four dimensional system in the variables
E, E∗, K and K∗ whose equations were derived in section 2.3 and are given
11Note that the number of varieties in the home region, VH(t), is equal to the capital
stock at home, K(t), as one variety exactly requires one unit of capital as fixed input
(analogously K∗(t) ≡ VF (t)). This implies that capital accumulation in one region is
tantamount to firm creation.
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by12
K˙ =
[
ξ
σF
(
E
K + φK∗
+
φE∗
φK +K∗
)
− δ
]
K +
L
F
− E
F
, (28)
E˙ = −µ(ρ+ µ)FK + E
[
ξ
σF
(
E
K + φK∗
+
φE∗
φK +K∗
)
− ρ− δ
]
,(29)
K˙∗ =
[
ξ
σF
(
E∗
K∗ + φK
+
φE
φK∗ +K
)
− δ
]
K∗ +
L
F
− E
∗
F
, (30)
E˙∗ = −µ(ρ+ µ)FK∗ + E∗
[
ξ
σF
(
E∗
K∗ + φK
+
φE
φK∗ +K
)
− ρ− δ
]
.
(31)
Here we used that the equilibrium wage rate is equal to one in both regions
and we already substituted for the rental rates from equations (26) and
(27).13 For the special case of µ = 0 this system of equations is exactly
identical to the one obtained by Baldwin (1999) with an infinitely lived
representative agent.
A long-run equilibrium of this model characterized by the steady-state
values E¯, K¯, E¯∗ and K¯∗ must fulfill the system with the left hand side set
equal to zero. It can be verified14 that the symmetric outcome with K = K∗
and E = E∗ has this property with the steady-state values given by15
E¯sym =
Lσ
(
σδ2 + ρσδ − 2µ(µ+ ρ)(σ − ξ) + δ√σ√σ(δ + ρ)2 + 4µ(µ+ ρ)ξ)
2(δσ + (µ+ ρ)(σ − ξ))(δσ + µ(ξ − σ)) ,
(32)
K¯sym =
δLσ(σ + ξ) + L
√
σ(σ − ξ)
(
ρ
√
σ −√σ(δ + ρ)2 + 4µ(µ+ ρ)ξ)
2F (δσ + (µ+ ρ)(σ − ξ))(δσ + µ(ξ − σ)) .
(33)
Investigating how these steady-state values of consumption expenditures
and capital react to varying mortality rates reveals some interesting fea-
12We again suppress time arguments here.
13Note also that due to the assumption of symmetric regions we have L = L∗ and
µ = µ∗ as well as F = F ∗, δ = δ∗, ρ = ρ∗, ξ = ξ∗ and σ = σ∗.
14This and most other results were derived with Mathematica. The corresponding files
are available from the authors upon request.
15Solving the system for the symmetric equilibrium values in fact yielded two solution
pairs. As one of them gives negative equilibrium expenditures for plausible parameter
values we restrict our attention to the economically meaningful solution pair.
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tures. The signs of the corresponding derivatives with respect to µ are,
however, analytically ambiguous. We therefore evaluated them at the fol-
lowing parameter values: µ = 0.0125 resulting in a life expectancy of 80
years16, δ = 0.05 implying that capital depreciates on average after 20 years,
ρ = 0.015, which is the value used by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), and
L = 1 and F = 2. Since there is considerable disagreement about the pa-
rameter values of σ and ξ in the literature, we used a wide range of plausible
values in our numerical calculations. As far as the former is concerned, a
plausible lower bound is σ = 2 as in Baldwin (1999). Most authors, how-
ever, consider σ ≈ 4 (cf. Bosker and Garretsen (2007), Brakman et al.
(2005), Krugman (1991), Krugman and Venables (1995), Martin and Ot-
taviano (1999) and Puga (1999)). In order to allow for all possibilities we
choose as an upper bound σ = 8. With respect to ξ, which in fact describes
the share of consumption expenditures for the good produced under increas-
ing returns to scale (relative to the good produced under constant returns
to scale), Head and Mayer (2003), Bosker and Garretsen (2007) and Puga
(1999) consider a value of ξ = 0.1, Baldwin (1999) and Krugman (1991)
set ξ = 0.3, Krugman and Venables (1995) choose ξ = 0.6 and Martin and
Ottaviano (1999) set ξ = 0.8. We therefore consider a possible parameter
range of 0.1 ≤ ξ ≤ 0.9 to account for this wide spread.17
Figure 1 and 2 reveal that for those parameter ranges the derivative
of E¯sym with respect to µ is positive, whereas the derivative of K¯sym is
negative.18 Consequently, a decrease in the mortality rate increases the
equilibrium capital stock and decreases equilibrium expenditures, which is
intuitively clear as a lower mortality rate increases the proportion of elderly
to young individuals. Since the former hold more capital, the aggregate
capital stock increases. This result is again consistent with the life-cycle
savings literature (cf. Gertler (1999), Futagami and Nakajima (2001) and
Zhang et al. (2003)).
When considering the effect of the mortality rate on the steady-state
16Since the probability of death during each year equals 0.0125, average life expectancy
is 1
0.0125
.
17Recall, however, that production of the agricultural good in both regions requires ξ
to be sufficiently small.
18We also investigated the derivatives for varying mortality rates. Assuming 0.008 ≤
µ ≤ 0.025 leading to a life expectancy between 40 and 120 years, and still considering the
aforementioned values for the other parameters, does not change our findings.
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Figure 1: Derivative of E¯sym with respect to µ
Figure 2: Derivative of K¯sym with respect to µ
16
consumption expenditure share19, E¯sym
δK¯sym+E¯sym
, even analytical results can
be derived. This share is obtainable from the ratio of the equilibrium capital
stock to the equilibrium expenditures20
K¯sym
E¯sym
=
2ξ
F (δσ + ρσ +
√
σ
√
σ(δ + ρ)2 + 4µ(µ+ ρ)ξ)
, (34)
which obviously depends negatively on the mortality rate. The steady-state
consumption expenditure share therefore increases with µ. This again illus-
trates that a higher mortality rate decreases savings and therefore increases
consumption relative to income.
4 Symmetric equilibrium stability -
The impact of introducing mortality on catas-
trophic agglomeration
New Economic Geography models emphasize that reciprocal liberalization
between initially symmetric regions leads to catastrophic agglomeration. In
this section we show that the introduction of mortality considerably re-
duces this possibility of the symmetric equilibrium to be unstable such that
agglomeration processes may not set in even if economic integration is pro-
moted up to a high degree.
4.1 Analytical results
The stability properties of the symmetric long-run equilibrium for varying
trade costs and mortality rates are analyzed by following the classical ap-
proach (cf. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004)) of linearizing the non-linear
dynamic system given in equations (28), (29), (30) and (31) around the
symmetric equilibrium and then by evaluating the eigenvalues of the corre-
sponding 4× 4 Jacobian matrix
Jsym =
(
J1 J2
J3 J4
)
, (35)
19This share is defined as equilibrium consumption expenditures divided by steady-state
income, where steady-state income is the sum of replacement investment, δK (equal to
savings in steady-state), and consumption expenditures.
20Simply calculate 1δK¯sym
E¯sym
+1
.
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where the four symmetric 2 × 2 sub-matrices Ji for i = 1, . . . , 4 are given
in appendix D. Solving the characteristic equation yields the following four
eigenvalues
eig1 =
1
2
(real1 −
√
rad1), (36)
eig2 =
1
2
(real1 +
√
rad1), (37)
eig3 =
1
(φ+ 1)2
√
σ
(real2 −
√
rad2), (38)
eig4 =
1
(φ+ 1)2
√
σ
(real2 +
√
rad2), (39)
where
real1 ≡ A√
σ
− δ,
rad1 ≡
(
A√
σ
+ δ
)2
+
(σ − ξ)
(
(A+B)2 + 4µ(µ+ ρ)ξ
)
σξ
,
real2 ≡ 3φA+A−
√
σ
(
δ
(
2φ2 + φ+ 1
)
+ (φ− 1)φρ) ,
rad2 ≡
(
A(φ− 1) + (δ(φ− 1) + φ(φ+ 3)ρ)√σ)2 +
(φ+ 1)(φσ + σ + φξ − ξ) ((A+B)2(φ− 1)2 + 4µ(φ+ 1)2(µ+ ρ)ξ)
ξ
,
with the parameter clusters A ≡ √σ(δ + ρ)2 + 4µ(µ+ ρ)ξ as well as B ≡
(δ + ρ)
√
σ. The signs and nature of these eigenvalues fully characterize the
system’s local dynamics around the symmetric equilibrium. Analytically
investigating them21 thus results in lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Eigenvalue 3 is decisive for the local stability properties of the
symmetric equilibrium. A positive eigenvalue 3 implies instability, a negative
one saddle path stability.
Proof. By investigating the expressions for the eigenvalues it is first easily
established that all of them are real. This holds since their radicals are
nonnegative for σ > ξ which is true for all parameter ranges considered22.
Convergence to or divergence from the symmetric equilibrium is therefore
21In order to get a first idea about the signs and nature of the eigenvalues, we also
calibrated the model and investigated the eigenvalues numerically. The corresponding
findings are presented in appendix D.
22Recall the parameter ranges σ > 1, 0 < δ ≤ 1, 0 < ρ ≤ 1, 0 < µ ≤ 1, 0 < ξ < 1 and
0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 which imply that A > 0 and B > 0.
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monotonic.
As there are two jump variables E and E∗, saddle path stability prevails
if and only if there are two negative eigenvalues. If fewer than two eigenvalue
are negative, the system is locally unstable. By inserting the expression for
A, it is easily established that real1 > 0. We can therefore immediately
conclude that eigenvalue 2 is positive for all parameter values. In order
to find out the sign of eigenvalue 1, we compare the real term with the
corresponding term under the radical. The square of the former is smaller
than the latter, implying that eigenvalue 1 is always negative. It remains to
investigate the signs of eigenvalues 3 and 4. Again we first check whether the
real part is nonnegative for all parameter values. By inserting the expression
for A, real2 can be rewritten as
real2 = −
√
σδ
(
2φ2 + φ+ 1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
term1
+
√
σ(1− φ)φρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
term2
+
(1 + 3φ)
√
σ(δ + ρ)2 + 4µ(µ+ ρ)ξ︸ ︷︷ ︸
term3
. (40)
All three terms are increasing in ρ, ξ and µ but react differently to changes
in φ, δ and σ. In order to show that real2 is nevertheless nonnegative for
all parameter values we set ρ, ξ and µ close to zero resulting in the “worst”,
i.e. most negative, outcome with respect to these parameters and then
check for which values of φ, δ and σ the above real part is still positive by
solving the corresponding system of inequalities. We find that this holds for
the whole parameter space implying that the fourth eigenvalue is definitely
positive. Summarizing, we have established that eigenvalue 2 and 4 are
always positive, whereas eigenvalue 1 is always negative. This proves the
crucial role of the third eigenvalue.
Having demonstrated that changes in the parameter values, and in par-
ticular of the mortality rate, can only influence the stability properties of
the symmetric equilibrium via eigenvalue 3, it is immediate to investigate
this eigenvalue more thoroughly. Figure 3 plots eigenvalue 3 as a function of
φ for µ = 0.0001 given our choice of the most plausible values of the other
parameters (ρ = 0.015, δ = 0.05, ξ = 0.3 and σ = 4). The graph shows that,
depending on the level of trade costs, eigenvalue 3 is either positive or neg-
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Figure 3: Eigenvalue 3 for varying trade costs given µ = 0.0001
ative.23 The crucial question, however, is whether changes in the mortality
rate also influence the sign of eigenvalue 3.
Proposition 1. The sign of eigenvalue 3 and hence saddle path stability of
the symmetric equilibrium depends on the mortality rate.
Proof. To prove this proposition, we use the concept of the critical level
of trade costs φbreak. This threshold value identifies the degree of openness
where eigenvalue 3 switches its sign and therefore where the stability proper-
ties of the symmetric equilibrium change (cf. where eigenvalue 3 crosses the
horizontal axis in figure 3). To analytically obtain φbreak we set the expres-
sion for the third eigenvalue equal to zero and solve the resulting equation.
This yields two solutions for φbreak as functions of the other parameters.24
Since these two critical levels in particular also depend on the mortality rate,
proposition 1 holds.
4.2 The impact of mortality on catastrophic agglomeration
Using the results obtained in the previous section 4.1 we are now ready to
investigate the effects of aging on catastrophic agglomeration. Most notably,
23The numerical investigation of eigenvalue 3 in appendix D also reveals that it is
impossible to come up with a definite sign for the whole parameter space.
24As the expressions are rather cumbersome they are not presented here but available
upon request.
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we will show that a realistic mortality rate rules out the possibility of in-
stability of the symmetric equilibrium in the constructed capital model of
Baldwin (1999).
Figure 4, which plots the contour lines of eigenvalue 3 for for varying µ
and φ25 given our choice of the most plausible values of the other parameters
(ρ = 0.015, δ = 0.05, ξ = 0.3 and σ = 4), illustrates that there only exists
a very small range of combinations of µ and φ where the sign of the third
eigenvalue is positive. This instability region is characterized by parameter
Figure 4: Contour plot of eigenvalue 3
combinations inside the contour line=0 which yield a nonnegative eigenvalue
3. Higher transport costs26 or a higher mortality rate decrease the value of
eigenvalue 3 rather quickly. Only in case of an implausibly low mortality
rate it is possible to find critical values of transport costs within which the
symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable and agglomeration can set in.
Similar conclusions are obtained from investigating how the critical level
of trades costs reacts to changes in the mortality rate. Without mortal-
25Note that we plot this figure only for µ > 0.005 and φ > 0.85 which indicates how
small the instability region relative to the whole parameter range is.
26Remember that a lower value of φ is equivalent to higher transport costs.
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Figure 5: φbreak1 (dashed) and φbreak2 (solid) as a function of µ
ity, i.e. µ = 0, and the parameter values assumed by Baldwin (1999), i.e.
ρ = δ = 0.1, ξ = 0.3 and σ = 2, the two critical levels of trade costs are
φbreak1 = 0.860465 and φbreak2 = 1.27 In between those values, i.e. for suffi-
ciently low levels of trade costs, the symmetric equilibrium is unstable and
catastrophic agglomeration does occur. Allowing µ to be positive, however,
and still assuming the same values as Baldwin (1999) for the other param-
eters, establishes that φbreak1 increases, while φbreak2 decreases with µ (cf.
figure 5). The range where the symmetric equilibrium is unstable clearly
shrinks (in figure 3 an increase in µ would thus shift eigenvalue 3 down-
wards). A higher mortality rate therefore stabilizes the symmetric equilib-
rium and prevents the two regions from unequal development. In particular,
we can establish that for µ > 0.00395, implying a (plausible) life expectancy
of less than approximately 250 years, there exists no level of trade costs
such that the symmetric equilibrium is unstable (i.e. the downward shift in
figure 3 is such that eigenvalue 3 does not cross the horizontal axis anymore
where it would become positive28).29 In sharp contrast to Baldwin (1999)’s
27These values are exactly identical to those obtained by Baldwin (1999).
28Note that we have already plotted figure 3 for a very low mortality rate µ = 0.0001
to illustrate a case where it crosses the axis.
29We also performed these simulations with respect to the critical level of trade costs for
other parameter ranges, in particular for our choice of the most plausible values, ρ = 0.015,
δ = 0.05, ξ = 0.3 and σ = 4. In this case the critical mortality rate, above which the
symmetric equilibrium is always stable, is given by µ = 0.00028. This implies that if we
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catastrophic agglomeration result, our model thus predicts the symmetric
outcome to be the dominating one even in the presence of high economic in-
tegration. The introduction of finitely lived individuals profoundly stabilizes
the symmetric equilibrium.
4.3 Economic intuition
One immediate question refers to how and why the mortality rate influ-
ences the forces in our model that determine the stability properties of the
symmetric equilibrium. As shown by Baldwin (1999), the formal stability
analysis pursued in section 4.1 yields the same results as compared to a
more informal way of checking the stability of the symmetric equilibrium.
This informal way is based on investigating how an exogenous perturbation
of the home share of capital, θK , influences the profitability of home-based
firms relative to foreign-based firms. A positive impact would imply insta-
bility as even more firms would locate in the home region. Conducting this
more informal stability analysis can yield valuable insights into the forces
fostering or weakening agglomeration in our model.
The main mechanism behind all agglomeration tendencies is the follow-
ing demand linked circular causality between consumption expenditures and
capital: If expenditures in one region are exogenously increased, this implies
higher profits such that more firms enter the market, leading to a higher cap-
ital stock in the region. The higher capital stock is associated with higher
income and therefore further increases expenditures and profitability. This
agglomeration force was first introduced by Baldwin (1999) and is due to the
endogeneity of capital in his model. It hinges critically on the immobility
of capital as only in this case capital income cannot be repatriated to its
immobile owners and therefore increases the region’s own income. In our
model with capital immobility it is, however, indeed the case that the equi-
librium value of consumption expenditures depends, via this income effect,
on the capital stock. If stability of the symmetric equilibrium is now investi-
gated by the informal approach mentioned above, this particular equilibrium
reaction must be taken into account. Therefore the sign of the derivative
(dpi/dθK)equ ≡ dpi[θK , θ¯E [θK ];φ]/dθK30 evaluated at the symmetric equilib-
(realistically) assume a life expectancy of less than approximately 3500 years we never get
instability.
30We add the subscript (...)equ to indicate that equilibrium reactions of θE are taken
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rium should be checked, where θ¯E [θK ] gives equilibrium expenditures as a
function of the capital stock. As already mentioned, stability requires this
derivative to be negative since then, as Baldwin (1999) puts it, “...if a unit
of capital ’accidentally’ disturbed symmetry, the ’accident’ pushes capital’s
rental rate below its steady-state level in the ’receiving’ nation (home). This
induces home savers/investors to allow K to erode back to its pre-shock level.
Moreover, since dpi[...]/dθK > 0 means dpi∗[...]/dθK < 0, foreign savers react
in the opposite direction.” (Baldwin, 1999, p. 263). To gain more insights
about the forces at work we rewrite the derivative as(
dpi
dθK
)
equ
=
dpi
dθK
+
dpi
dθE
dθ¯E
dθK
. (41)
The first term on the right hand side of this equation, dpidθK , represents the
anti-agglomerative local competition effect which is negative and was already
described in section 2.4.2. The second term is the pro-agglomerative circular
causality force. It captures the fact that shifting production increases capital
income in the receiving nation and therefore expenditures, i.e. dθ¯EdθK > 0. This
in turn increases profits since dpidθE > 0, as was also mentioned in section
2.4.2, and therefore induces further capital accumulation. Since both, the
negative local competition effect, dpidθK , and the positive effect of expenditures
on profits, dpidθE , are independent of the mortality rate (cf. section 2.4.2), the
introduction of aging can only influence stability via the effect of production
shifting on expenditures, captured by the term dθ¯EdθK . In order to confirm our
stability result with respect to µ obtained by investigating the eigenvalues,
this derivative must decrease in the mortality rate such that higher mortality
weakens the agglomerative force and therefore increases stability. To put it
differently, the mortality rate determines how much weight is given to the
agglomeration force as compared to the dispersion force. The comparative
statics result of section 3 suggest some possible lines of explanation why the
production shifting effect on expenditures should decrease in the mortality
rate.31 There we have shown that for plausible parameter values a higher µ
into account in this derivate in contrast to the pure local competition effect dpi
dθK
described
in section 2.4.2.
31Doing the informal stability analysis of Baldwin (1999) is impossible in our model
setup due to the fact that the additional expression −µ(ρ+µ)FK appears in the aggregate
Euler equations as an additive term and makes them highly nonlinear. As a consequence
the production shifting effect on expenditures, dθ¯E
dθK
, is not obtainable.
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implies a larger proportion of young and poor compared to old and wealthy
individuals. Aggregate equilibrium expenditures are therefore already higher
and do not react that much to production shifting. This effect seems to
dominate all the other forces that work in favor of an increase of dθ¯EdθK in
µ, e.g. the increase in equilibrium profits resulting from a higher mortality
rate.32
5 Concluding remarks
The model in this paper generalizes the constructed capital framework of
Baldwin (1999) by allowing for more realistic demographic structures. In
particular, incorporating finite planning horizons makes it possible to in-
vestigate the impacts of population aging on agglomeration tendencies of
economic activities. We show that in the case of reasonable mortality rates,
even very low levels of trade costs do not lead to catastrophic agglomera-
tion. Introducing mortality therefore stabilizes the symmetric equilibrium
and acts as a force that promotes a more equal distribution of productive
factors between two regions.
From the point of view of economic policy, the most important insight is
that, in sharp contrast to other New Economic Geography approaches, our
model does not necessarily associate deeper integration with higher inter-
regional inequality. In particular, we have shown that plausible parameter
values are far away from supporting core-periphery outcomes. Consequently,
there is no need to impose trade barriers like tariffs and quotas to increase
transport costs in order to avoid deindustrialization of one region. Especially
in the case of Europe this implies that there is no tradeoff between the two
most important targets of the European Union: integration on the one hand
and interregional equality on the other hand. Instead, the implementation
of appropriate policies to achieve one objective does not interfere with the
realization of the other goal.
However, introducing mortality was only a first step in making Bald-
win (1999)’s constructed capital model more realistic. The assumption of
a constant mortality rate adopted for the sake of analytical tractability is
still at odds with reality. Using age dependent mortality rates is therefore
32The positive dependence of equilibrium profits on the mortality rate can be shown
easily. It indicates that a higher mortality rate amplifies the expenditure shifting effect
that is associated with shifting production (capital) to the other region.
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one possible line for future research. Moreover, it would be worthwhile to
consider the effects of varying mortality rates between regions. In such a
setting one could investigate how differences in mortality rates are linked to
differences in capital accumulation rates, again a question of high relevance
for economic policy.
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Appendix
A The individual’s utility optimization problem
Suppressing time arguments in the optimization procedure the current value
Hamiltonian for the individual’s optimization problem can be written as
H(e, k, λ, t) = ln
[ e
P
]
+ λ
(
wl + pik − e
wF
+ µk − δk
)
(42)
where P is the perfect price index translating expenditures into indirect
utility.33 The first order conditions of the problem associated with equation
(42) are given by
∂H
∂e
.= 0 ⇒ 1
e
=
λ
Fw
, (43)
∂H
∂k
.= (ρ+ µ)λ− λ˙ ⇒ λ˙
λ
= − pi
Fw
+ ρ+ δ, (44)
∂H
∂λ
.= k˙ ⇒ wl + pik − e
wF
+ µk − δk = k˙ (45)
and the standard transversality condition. Taking the time derivative of
equation (43) under the assumption that w is time independent34 and com-
bining it with equation (44) yields the consumption Euler equation for the
representative individual
e˙
e
=
pi
Fw
− δ − ρ.
The static problem of dividing consumption between the manufacturing
composite and the agricultural good for fixed consumption expenditure e
can be formulated as
max
caggm ,cn
(cn)1−ξ(caggm )
ξ
s.t. pncn + paggm c
agg
m = e, (46)
where paggm is an appropriate price index which can be shown to equal a
33This price index can be obtained from the solution to the optimization problem in
stage two and three.
34Section 2.4.1 shows that this indeed holds as the wage rate is pinned down by the
price of the agricultural good which is chosen to be the numeraire of the economy.
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weighted average of the two Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) price indexes at home
and foreign with the foreign price index being augmented by transport costs.
Setting up the Lagrangian as
`(cn, caggm , λa) = (cn)
1−ξ(caggm )
ξ + λa (e− pncn − paggm caggm ) (47)
and solving for the first order conditions yields
∂`
∂cn
.= 0 ⇒ (1− ξ)(cn)−ξ(caggm )ξ = λapn, (48)
∂`
∂caggm
.= 0 ⇒ (cn)1−ξξ(caggm )ξ−1 = λapaggm , (49)
∂`
∂λa
.= 0 ⇒ pncn + paggm caggm = e. (50)
Manipulating these first order conditions leads to unit elastic demands for
the agricultural good and the CES composite of manufactured goods given
by
cn =
(1− ξ)e
pn
caggm =
ξe
paggm
. (51)
Taking into account the Cobb-Douglas specification of utility in these two
goods it is no surprise that a fraction ξ of income used for consumption is
spent on manufactures and a fraction 1− ξ on the agricultural good.
In the last stage the static problem of distributing manufacturing con-
sumption among different varieties for fixed manufacturing consumption ex-
penditure ξe can be formulated as
max
cHm(i),c
F
m(j)
[∫ VH
0
(
cHm(i)
)σ−1
σ di+
∫ VF
0
(
cFm(j)
)σ−1
σ dj
] σ
σ−1
s.t.
∫ VH
0
pHm(i)c
H
m(i)di+
∫ VF
0
pFm,ϕ(j)c
F
m(j)dj = ξe. (52)
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Setting up the Lagrangian as
`(cHm(i), c
F
m(j), λm) =
[∫ VH
0
(
cHm(i)
)σ−1
σ di+
∫ VF
0
(
cFm(j)
)σ−1
σ dj
] σ
σ−1
+
λm
[
ξe−
∫ VH
0
pHm(i)c
H
m(i)di−
∫ VF
0
pFm,ϕ(j)c
F
m(j)dj
]
(53)
and solving for the first order conditions yields35
∂`
∂cHm(i)
.= 0 ⇒ σ
σ − 1
[∫ VH
0
(cHm(i))
σ−1
σ di+
∫ VF
0
(cFm(j))
σ−1
σ dj
] 1
σ−1
×σ − 1
σ
(cHm(i))
− 1
σ = λmpHm(i), (54)
∂`
∂cFm(j)
.= 0 ⇒ σ
σ − 1
[∫ VH
0
(cHm(i))
σ−1
σ di+
∫ VF
0
(cFm(j))
σ−1
σ dj
] 1
σ−1
×σ − 1
σ
(cFm(j))
− 1
σ = λmpFm,ϕ(j), (55)
∂`
∂λm
.= 0 ⇒
∫ VH
0
pHm(i)c
H
m(i)di+
∫ VF
0
pFm,ϕ(j)c
F
m(j)dj = ξe. (56)
Recalling the definition of caggm given below equation (1) these first order
conditions can be rewritten as
caggm
[∫ VH
0
(cHm(i))
σ−1
σ di+
∫ VF
0
(cFm(j))
σ−1
σ dj
]−1
(cHm(i))
− 1
σ = λmpHm(i),
(57)
caggm
[∫ VH
0
(cHm(i))
σ−1
σ di+
∫ VF
0
(cFm(j))
σ−1
σ dj
]−1
(cFm(j))
− 1
σ = λmpFm,ϕ(j).
(58)
Isolating cHm(i) and c
F
m(j) on the left hand side, then multiplying both sides
35Note that this is in fact a variational problem.
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by pHm(i) or p
F
m,ϕ(j) and finally integrating over all varieties yields∫ VH
0
pHm(i)c
H
m(i)di =
λ−σm
∫ VH
0 (p
H
m(i))
1−σdi
[∫ VH
0 (c
H
m(i))
σ−1
σ di+
∫ VF
0 (c
F
m(j))
σ−1
σ dj
]−σ
(caggm )−σ
,∫ VF
0
pFm,ϕ(j)c
F
m(j)dj =
λ−σm
∫ VF
0 (p
F
m,ϕ(j))
1−σdj
[∫ VH
0 (c
H
m(i))
σ−1
σ di+
∫ VF
0 (c
F
m(j))
σ−1
σ dj
]−σ
(caggm )−σ
.
Adding these two expressions, using the budget constraint from above, and
isolating λm gives the following equation for the Lagrange multiplier, i.e.
the shadow price of manufacturing consumption,
λm =
(ξe)−
1
σ caggm
[∫ VH
0 (p
H
m(i))
1−σdi+
∫ VF
0 (p
F
m,ϕ(j))
1−σdj
] 1
σ[∫ VH
0 (c
H
m(i))
σ−1
σ di+
∫ VF
0 (c
F
m(j))
σ−1
σ dj
] . (59)
Plugging this expression back into equations (57) and (58) finally leads to
the demands for all varieties given by
cHm(i) =
ξe(pHm(i))
−σ[∫ VH
0 (p
H
m(i))1−σdi+
∫ VF
0 (p
F
m,ϕ(j))1−σdj
] ,
cFm(j) =
ξe(pFm,ϕ(j))
−σ[∫ VH
0 (p
H
m(i))1−σdi+
∫ VF
0 (p
F
m,ϕ(j))1−σdj
] .
B Aggregation over individuals
The aggregate Euler equation can be derived as follows.36 Taking the time
derivative of aggregate consumption expenditures given in equation (10)
36The derivations shown in this appendix closely follow the ones described by Heijdra
and van der Ploeg (2002) in chapter 16.
30
yields
E˙(t) = µe(t, t) + µ
∫ t
−∞
e˙(t0, t)e−µ(t−t0) + e(t0, t)(−µ)e−µ(t−t0)dt0
= µe(t, t)− µE(t) + µ
∫ t
−∞
e˙(t0, t)e−µ(t−t0)dt0, (60)
where we used the definition of aggregate consumption expenditures in go-
ing from the first to the second line. To arrive at the final aggregate Euler
equation it is necessary to derive optimal consumption expenditures e(t, t) of
newborns in the planning period t and the aggregate consumption expendi-
ture rule E(t). To achieve this we reformulate the individual’s optimization
problem as follows. In line with equation (1) the expected utility U(t0, t) at
an arbitrary point in time t of a consumer born at time t0 ≤ t is given by
U(t0, t) ≡
∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ+µ)(τ−t)ln
(
e(t0, τ)
P (τ)
)
dτ, (61)
where we again used the perfect price index P translating expenditures in
indirect utility (cf. appendix A). The law of motion of capital given in
equation (2) can be rewritten as
k˙(t0, τ) =
w(τ)l(t0, τ) + pi(τ)k(t0, τ)− e(t0, τ)
w(τ)F
+ µk(t0, τ)− δk(t0, τ)
=
(
pi(τ)
w(τ)F
+ µ− δ
)
k(t0, τ) +
l(t0, τ)
F
− e(t0, τ)
w(τ)F
. (62)
From equation (62) the individual’s lifetime budget can be derived. First
both sides of the equation are multiplied by e−RA(t,τ) ≡ e−
∫ τ
t
(
pi(s)
w(s)F
+µ−δ
)
ds
and rearranged to[
k˙(t0, τ)−
(
pi(τ)
w(τ)F
+ µ− δ
)
k(t0, τ)
]
e−R
A(t,τ) =
[
l(t0, τ)
F
− e(t0, τ)
w(τ)F
]
e−R
A(t,τ).
(63)
Observing that the left hand side of equation (63) is d
[
k(t0, τ)e−R
A(t,τ)
]
/dτ
by applying Leibnitz’s rule to recognize that dRA(t, τ)/dτ = pi(τ)w(τ)F + µ− δ
and integrating over the interval [t,∞) yields∫ ∞
t
d
[
k(t0, τ)e−R
A(t,τ)
]
=
∫ ∞
t
[
l(t0, τ)
F
− e(t0, τ)
w(τ)F
]
e−R
A(t,τ)dτ.
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This expression can be solved to
lim
τ→∞ k(t0, τ)e
−RA(t,τ) − k(t0, t)e−RA(t,t) = HW (t)−
∫ ∞
t
e(t0, τ)
w(τ)F
e−R
A(t,τ)dτ,
(64)
where we defined HW (t) ≡ ∫∞t w(τ)l(t0,τ)w(τ)F e−RA(t,τ)dτ denoting human wealth
of individuals in capital units consisting of the present value of lifetime
wage income using the annuity factor RA(t,τ) for discounting. Note that
e−RA(t,t) = 1 and that the first term on the left hand side represents “ter-
minal capital holdings”. These holdings must be equal to zero because first,
the insurance company will ensure their nonnegativity, and second, it is sub-
optimal for an individual to have positive terminal assets as there is neither
a bequest motive nor satiation from consumption. Taking this into account
yields the following solvency condition
lim
τ→∞ e
−RA(t,τ)k(t0, τ) = 0, (65)
which prevents an individual from running a Ponzi game against the life-
insurance company. The No-Ponzi-Game condition can be inserted in equa-
tion (64) to obtain the individual’s lifetime budget restriction
k(t0, t) +HW (t) =
∫ ∞
t
e(t0, τ)
w(τ)F
e−R
A(t,τ). (66)
The present value of an individual’s consumption expenditure plan in cap-
ital units must be equal to the sum of human wealth in capital units and
capital holdings (=total wealth). Evaluating the lifetime budget constraint
at t = t0 shows that the discounted sum of lifetime labor earnings must
equal discounted consumption expenditures.37 This implies, from investi-
gating the law of motion for capital, that discounted savings are equal to
discounted accumulated profits, i.e. savings are only used for reallocating
consumption across lifetime.
Maximizing expected utility given in equation (61) subject to the budget
constraint in equation (66) yields the following first order condition
1
e(t0, τ)
e−(ρ+µ)(τ−t) = λ(t)
1
w(τ)F
e−R
A(t,τ), τ ∈ [t,∞), (67)
37Note that capital holdings of newborns k(t0, t0) are zero by assumption (no bequests).
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where λ(t) represents the marginal expected lifetime utility of wealth.38 In-
dividuals should therefore plan consumption expenditures in a way such that
the appropriately discounted marginal utility of expenditures and wealth are
equated.
Applying equation (67) for the planning period (τ = t) yields e(t0, t) =
w(t)F
λ(t) . Using this result and then substituting for λ(t) also from the first
order condition in equation (67) helps to establish the following equality∫ ∞
t
e(t0, t)e−(ρ+µ)(τ−t)dτ =
∫ ∞
t
w(t)F
λ(t)
e−(ρ+µ)(τ−t)dτ
= Fw(t)
∫ ∞
t
e(t0, τ)
Fw(τ)
e−R
A(t,τ)dτ.
Integrating out and using the lifetime budget constraint of equation (66)
finally yields consumption expenditures e(t0, t) in the planning period t
e(t0, t)
ρ+ µ
[
−e−(ρ+µ)(τ−t)
]∞
t
= Fw(t)[k(t0, t) +HW (t)]
e(t0, t) = (ρ+ µ)Fw(t)[k(t0, t) +HW (t)]. (69)
The above equation clearly shows that optimal consumption expenditures
in the planning period t in capital units, e(t0,t)Fw(t) , are proportional to total
wealth with the marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth being
constant and equal to the “effective” rate of time preference ρ+ µ.
Using this expression for optimal consumption expenditures in the def-
inition of aggregate consumption expenditures in equation (10) yields the
following very simple aggregate consumption expenditure rule
E(t) ≡ µ
∫ t
−∞
e−µ(t−t0)(ρ+ µ)Fw(t)[k(t0, t) +HW (t)]dt0
= (ρ+ µ)Fw(t)µ
[∫ t
−∞
e−µ(t−t0)k(t0, t)dt0 +
∫ t
−∞
e−µ(t−t0)HW (t)dt0
]
= (ρ+ µ)Fw(t) [K(t) +HW (t)] , (70)
38Differentiating this first order condition with respect to τ , inserting the expression
for λ(t) also obtainable from this first order condition and simplifying yields the following
Euler equation
e˙(t0, τ)
e(t0, τ)
=
pi(τ)
w(τ)F
− ρ− δ + w˙(τ)
w(τ)
. (68)
With time-invariant wages (cf. section 2.4.1) this Euler equation is exactly the same as
the one obtained in equation (6).
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where the aggregate capital stock is defined in equation (7) and can be
rewritten in analogy to aggregate consumption expenditures given in equa-
tion (10). Moreover it is easily established that µHW (t)
[
e−µ(t−t0)
µ
]t
−∞
=
HW (t).39
Finally we modify equation (60) by substituting for e(t, t) and E(t) from
the derived expressions of equation (69) evaluated at birth date t40 and
equation (70) as well as for e˙(t0, t) from the individual Euler equation given
in expression (68). Dividing by E(t) then gives the aggregate Euler equation
E˙(t)
E(t)
= −µ(ρ+ µ)Fw(t)K(t)
E(t)
+
µ
E(t)
∫ t
−∞
e(t0, t)
[
pi(t)
w(t)F
− ρ− δ + w˙(t)
w(t)
]
e−µ(t−t0)dt0
= −µ(ρ+ µ)Fw(t)K(t)
E(t)
+
pi(t)
w(t)F
− ρ− δ + w˙(t)
w(t)
= −µE(t)− e(t, t)
E(t)
+
e˙(t0, t)
e(t0, t)
,
where in the second line we used again the definition of aggregate consump-
tion expenditure from equation (10) and the term w˙(t)/w(t) disappears in
the case of time invariant wages (cf. section 2.4.1).
C The manufacturing firm’s profit maximization
problem - Derivation of rental rates
Inserting optimal demands for varieties into operating profits leads to the
following expression to be maximized
(pHm(i, t)− w(t)β)
(∫ t
−∞
ξe(t0, t)(pHm(i, t))
−σ
Pm(t)
N(t0, t)dt0
)
+
(pFm,ϕ(i, t)− w(t)ϕβ)
(∫ t
−∞
ξe∗(t0, t)(pFm,ϕ(i, t))−σ
P ∗m(t)
N∗(t0, t)dt0
)
,
39This aggregation property of consumption expenditures is due to the fact that we
assumed a constant probability of death implying an age independent marginal propensity
to consume out of total wealth (see equation (69)).
40Note again that k(t, t) = 0 and newborns therefore consume a fraction of their human
wealth at birth, i.e. e(t, t) = (ρ+ µ)Fw(t)HW (t).
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whose derivatives with respect to pHm(i, t) and p
F
m,ϕ(i, t) are set equal to zero
to yield the first order conditions
0 =
(1− σ)(pHm(i, t))−σξe(t0, t)
Pm(t)
N(t0, t)
+
σ(pHm(i, t))
−σ−1ξe(t0, t)
Pm(t)
w(t)βN(t0, t),
0 =
(1− σ)(pFm,ϕ(i, t))−σξe∗(t0, t)
P ∗m(t)
N∗(t0, t)
+
σ(pFm,ϕ(i, t))
−σ−1ξe∗(t0, t)
P ∗m(t)
w(t)βϕN∗(t0, t).
Rearranging and simplifying gives optimal prices
pHm(i, t) =
σ
σ − 1w(t)β,
pFm,ϕ(i, t) =
σ
σ − 1w(t)βϕ.
Using the above first order conditions in the definition of operating profits
yields
pi(t) =
pHm(t)
σ
(∫ t
−∞
cHm(t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0
)
+
pFm,ϕ(t)
σ
(∫ t
−∞
cH∗m (t0, t)N
∗(t0, t)dt0
)
,
where an equivalent equation holds in the foreign region. Note that the
variety index i can be dropped since prices and therefore profits are equal
for all firms. Applying the definitions of the share variables sHH(t), s
F
H(t),
sFF (t), and s
H
F (t) given above in equations (22) and (23) leads to the following
expressions for the rental rates
pi(t) =
ξ
σ
(∫ t
−∞
sHH(t)e(t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0 +
∫ t
−∞
sFH(t)e
∗(t0, t)N∗(t0, t)dt0
)
,
pi∗(t) =
ξ
σ
(∫ t
−∞
sFF (t)e
∗(t0, t)N∗(t0, t)dt0 +
∫ t
−∞
sHF (t)e(t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0
)
.
Inserting optimal demands from equation (4) into the definitions for the
share variables and again using mill pricing from equations (20) and (21)
yields the share variables as functions of home and foreign capital stocks as
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well as of the level of transport costs41
sHH(t) =
1
K(t) + φK∗(t)
, (71)
sFH(t) =
φ
K(t)φ+K∗(t)
. (72)
Using them in equations (24) and (25) gives the final expressions for rental
rates
pi =
(
θE
θK + φ(1− θK) +
(1− θE)φ
φθK + 1− θK
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bias
(
ξEW
σKW
)
,
pi∗ =
(
1− θE
1− θK + φθK +
θEφ
φ(1− θK) + θK
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bias∗
(
ξEW
σKW
)
.
D Intermediate results for the stability analysis
The Jacobian matrix Jsym, which is evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium
and given in equation 35, has the following entries Ji for i = 1, . . . , 4:
J1 =
1
2(φ+ 1)
√
σ
(
A(φ+ 2)−Bφ (A+B)φ
(A+B)φ A(φ+ 2)−Bφ
)
, (73)
J2 =
 −F (A+B)2(φ2+1)4(φ+1)2ξ − Fµ(µ+ ρ) − (A+B)2Fφ2(φ+1)2ξ
− (A+B)2Fφ2(φ+1)2ξ
−F (A+B)2(φ2+1)
4(φ+1)2ξ − Fµ(µ+ ρ)
 ,
(74)
J3 =
1
F (φ+ 1)σ
(
ξ − (φ+ 1)σ φξ
φξ ξ − (φ+ 1)σ
)
, (75)
J4 =
 φ(A+ρ√σ)−δ(φ2+φ+1)√σ(φ+1)2√σ − (A+B)φ(φ+1)2√σ
− (A+B)φ
(φ+1)2
√
σ
φ(A+ρ√σ)−δ(φ2+φ+1)√σ
(φ+1)2
√
σ
 , (76)
with the parameter clusters A ≡ √σ(δ + ρ)2 + 4µ(µ+ ρ)ξ as well as B ≡
(δ + ρ)
√
σ.
In order to get a first insight into the nature and signs of the eigenvalues
of Jsym, we calibrated the model using the parameter values ρ = 0.015 and
41Note that the number of varieties in the home region VH(t) is equal to the capital stock
at home K(t) as one variety exactly requires one unit of capital as fixed input (analogously
K∗(t) ≡ VF (t)).
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Figure 6: Eigenvalue 1
δ = 0.05 and allowing the elasticity of substitution and the manufacturing
share of consumption to vary within the ranges 2 ≤ σ ≤ 8 and 0.1 ≤ ξ ≤ 0.9.
Figures 6, 7, 8 and 9 illustrate the numerical investigation of the signs of
the eigenvalues for σ = 4, ξ = 0.3 and varying µ and φ.42
First, the figures suggest that all eigenvalues are real for the chosen pa-
rameter space. Moreover, figures 6, 7 and 9 show that the first eigenvalue
is always negative, whereas the second and fourth are always positive. This
result is independent of the level of transport costs and the mortality rate.
Saddle path stability of the symmetric equilibrium therefore seems to cru-
cially depend on the third eigenvalue by requiring it to be negative. As can
be seen from the 3D plot in figure 8 there only exists a very small range of
combinations of low µ and high φ where the sign of the third eigenvalue is
positive. One is therefore tempted to conclude that with a sufficiently high
mortality rate, the symmetric equilibrium is stable for all levels of transport
costs.
42We also conducted the same simulations for other values of σ and ξ within the consid-
ered range. Overall we find that our findings with respect to the signs of the eigenvalues
are insensitive to changes in those parameters.
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Figure 7: Eigenvalue 2
Figure 8: Eigenvalue 3
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Figure 9: Eigenvalue 4
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